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The East Timor Conflict:
Fretilin's Struggle and the International Perspectives

by

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Introduction

"In March in the region of Bobonaro some Timorese, incited by troops, lured three members of the armed resistance (Fretilin) into a trap and killed them. They took their heads to Bobonaro. The soldiers forced the people to dance for two nights in front of the heads and to kick the heads during the macabre dance. A high official then came from Dili (the capital) to reward the 'heroes' who had brought the heads. The whole population was assembled, and the heroes of the episode were solemnly presented with a small sum of money.

"Since March in the area of Hau Ba, near Bobonaro, many men and boys were arrested and killed. In the district of Kota Boot, near Hau Ba, almost all the men and boys disappeared. They were taken away by the soldiers, killed and thrown into the bush. There are eye-witnesses of the event. The witnesses speak of the total extermination of the population.

"At the end of April, two sacks containing human bodies were thrown into a gulley on the Dili-Dare road at a place called Na'in. Some people noticed the smell and found the sacks with bodies. By the middle of May the sacks had been taken away. The bodies are presumed to have been those of political prisoners....

"On May 3o, Tomas da Silva, Jacinto da Silva, Vicente Freitas, from Becoli were arrested and taken to Baucau. They were killed in Baucau at midnight by the soldiers. The reason: they had contacts with Fretilin. During May about loo people from Allas, most of them men and boys, were arrested and taken to Same. Among them was the headman from Allas and his staff. In Same they were tortured terribly to make them confess they had contact with Fretilin. A witness states that he heard the victims' piercing screams and could not sleep.

"At the end of May and the beginning of June in the hamlet of Leoma, near Bazar-Tete, the soldiers began to arrest and kill many men and boys. Some managed to escape and hide in other hamlets or with relatives. On May 15, in the town of Laleia, an Indonesian soldier was seen openly kicking a head in the street. It seemed to be a boy's. All the people witnessed this in silence without saying a word or showing any reaction. Fear forces the people to hide their strongest feelings of revulsion."

This is an excerpt of a recent letter, written by a Catholic priest in East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, that was invaded and occupied by its neighbor Indonesia on December 7, 1975, almost lo years ago. The letter was smuggled out, in order to circumvent Indonesian censorship. A few days before, another priest described the general atmosphere in the following terms:

"The greatest suffering now is that the people are confined to their villages, have nothing to eat, are ill-treated, tortured, detained, raped, killed. They are suffering from hunger, but they have no drugs, because the authorities will not allow drugs to circulate for fear that some may fall into the hands of the resistance. Illness and hunger are also carrying out their policy of exterminating the population..... The diocese has been waiting since April to collect 12 boxes of drugs from the customs, and the invaders always create difficulties, and from April until now they have not allowed us to collect these drugs. It is another example of the way gifts from outside stay in the hands of the aggressors."[1]

Letters such as these are only too typical, and they provide some insight into a cruel and grim situation. But before we proceed any further with this account it may be useful to sketch some historical background and to describe some essential features of Indonesia's domestic policy. After that, I will turn to Indonesian foreign policy, the plight of East Timor and the international perspectives.

1. Background and domestic policy under Sukarno

With more than 3,ooo larger and smaller islands covering some 2,o27,o87 square kilometres (47 times the size of Denmark), the Republic of Indonesia is the fifth-largest country on earth, with a population of about 15o million (3o times the population of Denmark). For more than 3oo years, 16oo-1949, Indonesia was a Dutch colony with two short interruptions, first during the Napoleonic wars when it was occupied by France and later Britain (18o6-1815), and secondly during World War Two when it was occupied by Japan (1942-1945). Following the Japanese defeat, Dutch authorities assumed they could continue their colonial policy just as they had done back in 1815 but this was not to be: The war had seen the creation of a strong nationalist movement which proclaimed independence in 1945 but had to wage a four years' war of liberation until the Dutch finally surrendered and withdrew from all of Indonesia with one exception, namely West Papua, to which we return later on (section 5).

The period of independence can be divided into two parts, one from 1949 to 1965 under the leadership of Sukarno, and the other one from 1965 under the leadership of general Suharto who is still in power today. During the Sukarno period there were two important sources of power: on the left, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which at that time was legal and was one of the largest communist parties in the world (counting only those in opposition) and which tended to favour China with regard to the growing Sino-Soviet split. On the right, the military which was financed and trained by the United States, even though the U.S. was strongly opposed to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Sukarno administration (we describe below the U.S. attempt to overthrow Sukarno in 1958: section 4). For more than 15 years, Sukarno governed by playing off these forces against each other, but in 1965 the balance broke down in connection with the aborted coup by the September 3o Movement (known in Indonesia as the G 3o S).

The events of 1965 are still highly controversial. The Suharto government claims that the PKI was behind the G 3o S coup and some foreign scholars accept this version. However, it has never been proven. Other scholars tend to believe that an internal struggle was taking place within the military and that the PKI was not involved and this was, incidentally, also the position taken by the CIA in their internal documents. Even today, it is easy to discover the tendence of any given book on Indonesia by checking out how it deals with the events of 1965: if there is talk about a "communist coup," it is probably sympathetic to the present government. At any rate, the attempted coup gave the military (and thus Suharto) a welcome pretext to launch a successful counter-coup, seize power and set out to crush the PKI. [2]

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The following six months saw a large-scale massacre on communists and alleged communists which according to an official 1976 statement by admiral Sudomo, then head of the Indonesian state security system, cost about 5oo,ooo lives. Sudomo is not likely to exaggerate. The official figure for arrests is 75o,ooo. Of these only some 8oo were brought to trial, usually receiving death sentences. Amnesty International estimated in 1977 that there were still between 55,ooo and 1oo,ooo political prisoners that had been held for as much as 12 years without charge or trial. Since then, most of them have been released (following an international campaign by AI and others) but many have been placed in so-called "transition camps" which merely seem to serve as new prisons, and it is still difficult (or impossible) for all of them to find any employment because they cannot get a certificate of non-involvement in the G 3o S affair.

However, all this did not give reason to much concern among western circles that normally protest very strongly against violations of human rights in the socialist countries. Thus, C.A. Sulzberger of the New York Times remarked that "from an American viewpoint, this represents a positive achievement." He refers only to the generals' counter-coup. The associated bloodbath, already well under way, he does not even find worthy of mention (December 3, 1965). Back in 1954, Indonesia specialist Guy Pauker had feared that the Indonesian anti-communist forces "would probably lack the ruthlessness that made it possible for the Nazis to suppress the Communist Party of Germany" in 1933, since they "are weaker than the Nazis, not only in numbers and in mass-support, but also in unity, discipline and leadership." But four years later he explained (much to his relief) that "the assassination of the six army generals by the September 30 Movement elicited the ruthlessness that I had not anticipated a year earlier and resulted in the death of large numbers of communist cadres." The most distorted version of these events that I have seen so far comes from George McArthur, the well-known Far Eastern correspondent of the Los Angeles Times. Indiscussing relations between Indonesia and China he states that "the Indonesians broke relations in 1965, when the Mao-inspired Communist Party, now outlawed, attempted to seize power and subjected the country to a bloodbath" (November 15, 1978). Here, the victims of the massacre have become the guilty ones, and thus the truth has been turned completely upside down.[3]

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2. Elections and media under Suharto

Under Suharto's "New Order," Indonesia has in many ways become a peculiar country: in the first place, it is a democracy, yet the ruling party GOLKAR always wins about 60 per cent of the votes while the two opposition parties may share the rest. Secondly, although there is some opposition, it has very limited possibilities for conducting an electoral campaign, and it is forbidden to work for a change of government. Thirdly, there is freedom of the press, but if newspapers publish direct or merely indirect criticism of the government and particularly president Suharto, they risk being closed down for a shorter or longer period of time. Fourthly, Indonesia claims to favour negotiations and peaceful means in its foreign policy relations, yet it has used military force to take over West Papua in the 1960s and East Timor in the 1970s. Some people even suspect that it is planning to take over Papua New Guinea in a similar way during the 1980s.

Elections are rigged in many ways. Public employees, for instance, are supposed
to vote for GOLKAR, and since the voting takes place at the work place, they are more
or less forced to do so. Another method is to use three different ballot boxes, one
for each of the contending parties, so that authorities can make sure that people vote
for the right party. When, for the first time, East Timor took part in the
parliamentary elections in 1982, the official result was 308,046 votes for GOLKAR
and only 1,688 for the two opposition parties, in other words a total of 309,754 votes
cast. However, the number of registered voters was only 306,507. This means that the
4 voter turnout was more than 100 per cent, and this is no error: apparently, if you
vote for GOLKAR, you are allowed to vote more than once![4]

Foreign newspapers and magazines are allowed into Indonesia but unwanted
articles are censored by painting them over with black ink. Normally, though, it is
still possible to read the text if you hold the paper up against the light, which
means that many people are reading in a somewhat awkward position! When the
Australian reporter Peter Rodgers took pictures of starving children in East Timor in
late 1979, the Indonesian authorities refused to transmit them and they had to be
smuggled out. The picture and his story duly appeared in his paper, the *Sydney
Morning Herald* (November 1, 1979), but when the paper was laid out for sale
in Jakarta all of this was blacked out with ink. Sometimes this reaches even farcial
levels as when a particular issue of the Hong Kong weekly *Far Eastern Economic Review*
inadvertently slipped through the censor's hand although it contained an offending
article: The following week, subscribers were asked to return their copy of
the issue so that it could be censored. It is not known how many responded to this
call! Eventually, Peter Rodgers was expelled (in January 1981) just like numerous
other western correspondents before and after him. The authorities are very
sensitive and even minor criticism is considered unacceptable. General Benny Murdani,
5 commander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed forces, has publicly stated that "we are
jittery with journalists."[5]

The domestic press faces much more drastic measures if they do not conform to regulations, and this is nicely illustrated by what happened recently to the weekly magazine *Topik* and the fortnightly journal *Expo*. *Topik* was banned because of an editorial which "contains communist tendencies" and "promotes the idea of the class struggle," in the words of the censor. The offending issue focused its cover story on the question of poverty in Indonesia. The report was entitled "Looking for a hundred kinds of poor people," echoing the title of an article published a few months earlier by the glossy journal *Expo* which was also banned for publishing a report on "Indonesia's one hundred millionaires." The extract from *Topik's* editorial to which particular exception was taken reads as follows: "It is out of the question for the condition of the poor to change without having power. And power cannot be created unless it is seized. The seat of power will only come about if the oppressed exert themselves to seize it. This is a struggle that will take a very long time." The editorial also warned that romantic attitudes towards the poor are useless, nor is it any good displaying a kind of "platonic affection" for the poor. It is worthless to place trust in the "trickle-down mechanism." In another item in the same issue, a regular feature about "Eben," the popular character who expounds views and comments about current affairs, the opinion is expressed that "corruption in Indonesia is more dangerous than communism."

One month before *Topik* lost its licence, *Expo* was forced to close down following publication of a series of articles entitled "A hundred millionaires." The Information Ministry claimed that the articles were "full of personal abuse," "sensationalist" and "full of insinuations" and were therefore in violation of "a free and responsible press." The articles had certainly won the journal a great deal of popularity as circulation had gone up from 10,000 to 40,000 within weeks.

There was no help in this matter from the Indonesian Journalists' Association, PWI, whose chairman Zulharman has repeatedly warned of the need to "prevent PKI remnants from infiltrating its ranks." He said that the PWI would not lift a finger to defend *Topik* and call for the ban to be lifted, adding that the journalist who wrote the offending editorial would have to be identified and expelled from the PWI.[6]

So the question of poverty among the many as well as corruption among the few rich is virtually banned from public debate. A similar ban has existed for many years with regard to East Timor, and recently this ban was extended to include another important problem in contemporary Indonesia, namely the "mystery killers" as the press was ordered to call them (in May 1983) before all media coverage was banned three months later.

3. Army death squads and Tanjung Priok

"Don't ask me whether the government can say when the killings will stop. If I were to say that the government can stop them, that would mean acknowledging that the government is committing the killing." With these words, Benny Murdani refused to take responsibility for thousands of deaths since April 1983. Yet all the evidence shows they are the work of army death squads, and in the beginning it was no secret who was behind them. In April 1983, lieutenant-general Yogie Memet, territorial commander of Java and Madura, declared that "it is highly likely that the operation to combat criminality which is still in force in Jogjakarta will be extended to other cities in my command." And two months later he was supported by the minister of justice, Ali Said, with the slogan "It is better to have loo dead criminals than loo,ooo anxious citizens."

The Jogjakarta military began the killings and security forces everywhere continued the operation. The death squads are specially trained troops who dispose of their victims with ruthlessness. Athletic men "of military bearing" drag people from the street or their homes, to be shot or strangled later on. Most reports point to paracommandos from the elite KOPASSANDHA battalion, veterans of the war in East Timor, as the main perpetrators. The killing of up to lo,ooo people, by well-organized death squads, is yet another act of brutality by a regime with a long history of appalling human rights abuses.

"These killings are the beginning of a series of arbitrary actions by the authorities who think they can do whatever they like..... They want to show they have the right, the complete right, to take people's lives if these people are regarded as a threat, or as something that undermines their authority," said Buyung Nasution, who is chairman of the independent Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, adding that "many Indonesians are against these killings, but do not dare to criticize them." Some Indonesians try to spread the word abroad. A letter to the editor of the International Herald Tribune states: "Everyone I know in Jogjakarta, whether Indonesian or foreign, has either seen one of these killings or heard a first-hand account. For weeks this has been the hottest topic of conversation in town. There is no secret. People are being murdered by the hundred, and yet for some reason no one seems to have written an accurate account in the international press." The name and address of the writer was withheld by the newspaper -- for obvious reasons.

The Indonesian government describes the activities of army death squads as an operation against criminals. Most bodies are found marked with distinctive tattoos, which indicated they were members of youth gangs, known as gali-gali. Many people are trying desperately to remove tattoos which might incriminate them. Released prisoners have been committing petty crimes to be returned to the safety of jail and those due for release have pleaded to be allowed to stay. These killings have been going on for some years now. But little attention has been given to them by the western democracies or media, with the exception of Holland where the government was instructed to make formal representations about the killings to Indonesia.

The Suharto regime is being allowed to commit wholesale murder with barely a whisper of protest in the countries whose own governments give it financial support. A large part of this support comes from the IGGI, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, an association of western countries which have been providing financial assistance for Indonesia since 1969, shortly after the military's seizure of power. In 1969, the level was 568 million U.S. dollars. Since then, it has been growing steadily and the figure for 1984 was 2,46o million. On this basis, it is only

IGGI

natural for the Indonesian generals to conclude that the more grossly and 1 systematically they violate human rights, the more economic assistance will be provided by the western democracies.[7]

As a final example of Indonesia's domestic policy we will mention the massacre which took place in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta's harbour region, on September 12, 1984, when troops opened fire on a demonstration of muslims who were calling for the release of four mosque officials. The episode was in many respects a replica of what happened six months later in South Africa, except that the death toll was far higher, with more than 6o dead and a far higher number seriously wounded. In April 1985, 28 of these seriously wounded survivors were on trial in Jakarta even as the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher was holding talks with general Suharto, praising him for "defending independence and freedom." On the very day of her press conference in the Indonesian capital, verdicts of one to three years' imprisonment were passed on all the defendants who were found guilty largely on the basis of testimony from the very soldiers who shot them down with their automatic weapons. The defence lawyers had called for a public inquiry into the massacre and told the court that the defendants should by rights be suing the government for 3 damages, not standing trial. But obviously to no avail. Certainly, Indonesia has a peculiar way of "defending independence and freedom."[8]

4. Foreign policy: The U.S. invasion of 1958

The American government did not like Sukarno's government, and so they tried to remove it. But since this is a gross violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, they decided on a secret operation that -- even today -- remains unknown to most people outside Indonesia. Jonathan Kwitny of the Wall Street Journal has recently given an interesting account of this episode, based primarily on L. Fletcher Prouty, the liaison officer between the CIA and the air force and a longtime military intelligence official with experience in Asia:

The CIA trained large numbers of Indonesian dissidents and mercenaries at bases in the Philippines and returned them to the island of Sumatra, where they recruited other rebels. Prouty puts the number of trainees at 42,000 based on the number of rifles the CIA asked the marines to supply (it was so many rifles, Prouty writes, that the marines had to go to the army for 14,000 of them which puzzled army brass because they had not been informed of the operation). Meanwhile, the U.S. airforce from a base in Taiwan supplied a fleet of old B-26 bombers, refitted with a new machine gun package that greatly enhanced their firepower. Former U.S. military officers, working as CIA mercenaries, flew the planes. The U.S. navy landed many of the rebel troops on Sumatra by submarine, while others were parachuted in from the Philippines. Sumatra was where several U.S. oil companies were pumping, including a unit of Standard Oil of California. A rebel government was established and lasted several months.

Of course, the U.S. press and history books recorded the whole episode as a native rebellion. Sukarno was, to say the least, suspicious. At the height of the invasion, Howard P. Jones, the U.S. ambassador, answered Sukarno's suspicions by denying any U.S. involvement. He declared that Washington had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Indonesia. Reporting Jones' statement from Jakarta for the *New York Times*, Bernard Kalb noted "communist propaganda linking the United States with the rebels has been getting wide publicity here." Premier Viliana Siroky of Czechoslovakia, visiting Jakarta, correctly accused the U.S. of supporting the rebellion. It seems likely that he did so in order that Sukarno who himself had been trying to buy arms from the U.S. could maintain a diplomatic pose. Kalb wrote in the *New York Times*: "Some western diplomatic sources said tonight that Mr. Siroky had committed a grave breach of diplomatic protocol by making accusations during a state visit against nations with which Indonesia has diplomatic relations."

Although such one-sided pronouncements were reported, apparently there was no attempt -- by *any* newspaper -- to find out if the charges were true. (Kalb failed to return several phone messages from Kwitny, although his secretary said he had received them.) Even after a U.S. pilot was shot down and captured, the evidence was not considered impressive. The pilot's company had not yet been exposed as a CIA front. After Sukarno was turned down by the U.S., he bought small arms and military jets from Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia to help repel the invasion. The State Department condemned him for it. Secretary of State Dulles said the U.S. would not arm either side. "We intend to conform scrupulously to the principles of international law," he intoned. At a press conference, he was specifically asked: "Mr. Secretary, have we received a request for arms from the Indonesian rebels in Sumatra?" And he replied: "No, we have not." (strictly speaking, he may have been telling the truth: the rebels did not need to *ask* for arms, since the U.S. was giving it to them on its own initiative).

"And while he was publishing that falsehood," Prouty writes, "the United States furnished and piloted B-26 bombers and these were bombing shipping in the Makassar Strait. Some had even flown as far south as the Java Sea. Almost immediately all insurance rates on shipping to and from Indonesia went on a war-time scale and costs became so prohibitive that most shipping actually ceased," which certainly did not help the struggling economy Sukarno was trying to sustain.

Politically, the CIA-sponsored rebellion achieved exactly the opposite of what it supposedly intended for Indonesia (just as the invasion in the Bay of Pigs three years later did for Cuba). When Sukarno's army crushed the rebels after a few months, he immediately tightened security by abolishing the existing democratic framework. In 196o, he abolished parliament, and in 1963 he had himself named president for life.

In a footnote, Kwitny comments that "it seems outrageous that the U.S. government can still hide its role in the 1958 invasion of Indonesia, or in the 1965 coup there." It is. But it can. Not because the facts are impossible to discover, but rather because virtually all established reporters and scholars are so loyal to the U.S. system that they do not pose embarrasing questions.[9]

5. West Papua: Ignored and betrayed

New Guinea, the world's second largest island, received its name from early western explorers in 1546 because of the similarities between its inhabitants and the people of African Guinea. In 1848, Britain and Holland agreed to divide the island between them so that the eastern part would be a British and the western part a Dutch colony. After World War One, the British part passed to Australia as a mandated territory and eventually gained independence in 1975 under the name Papua New Guinea. In the western part, however, events took a rather different course.

Although the Dutch tried to restore colonial rule, they were eventually forced to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian Republic mainly because they lost the support of Washington which, hoisting the anti-colonial banner, used the threat of withdrawal of Marshall aid to force them to hand over power. (this is, incidentally, a pattern that has been repeated in many places on the globe with the U.S. helping to dismantle European colonial empires in order to take over for itself). Negotiations on the transfer took place at a Round Table Conference in 1949 and the transfer took place in December of that year, but West Papua was excluded from that transfer. Some Indonesians -- among them Sukarno -- wanted the new republic to incorporate not only the Dutch East Indies but also other Dutch-administered territories including West Papua. Others warned that this was an expansionist and imperialist policy with no end in sight, but this view did not find much support within Indonesia. Accordingly, with Indonesia staking a claim on West Papua, the future status of the area was still uncertain. And nobody -- neither Holland, Indonesia nor the U.S. -- bothered to consult the Papuans about their wishes. With a little effort they might have learned that the Papuans are Melanesians and belong to a different race than the Indonesians. The might also have discovered that the Papuans have a long tradition for rebellion against foreign rule -- whether Dutch, Japanese or anything else. But this was a factor not to be taken into consideration.

During the 1950s, Sukarno launched a large-scale campaign to "liberate" West Irian as the area was called then. While Moscow supplied weapons for Indonesia's ambitions, Washington provided the political framework. This was the New York Agreement, concluded in August 1962 and immediately ratified by the UN General Assembly, according to which the Dutch should transfer power to a UN administration in October of that year and seven months later, in May 1963, an Indonesian administration would take over. While paying lip-service to the principle of self-determination, the Agreement contained formulations that permitted the very betrayal of this principle. Self-determination, it stipulated, would be carried out "under arrangements made by Indonesia." The role of the UN was restricted to "advice, assistance, and participation," but not supervision. And finally, the Act of Free Choice would take place not later than 1969, giving Indonesia six ample years of control to prepare for the result it wanted.

Once again, the U.S. had come down on the side of Indonesia and against its own NATO ally. And once again, nobody found it worth while to consult the Papuans about their wishes.

On May 2, 1963, only one day after the transfer of power to the Indonesian administration, a huge bonfire was organized in the main square of Jayapura, the capital, presided over by Indonesia's minister of culture, Mrs. Rusiah Sardjono. Symbols of Papuan life, textbooks from schools and Papuan flags went up in flames. About 10,000 Papuans had been gathered to watch this ceremonial burning of Papuan culture which was described by Mrs. Sardjono as their "colonial identity," and immediately after this all independent political activity and expression of Papuan nationality were declared illegal under penalty of death. In this way, the stage was set for the Act of Free Choice envisioned in the New York Agreement. The change of power in Jakarta in 1965 -- from Sukarno to Suharto -- did not mean any change in policy towards West Papua, and by 1969 Indonesia was ready.

There was no pretense of freedom and democracy when major Soewondo of the Indonesian army rounded up village representatives in May 1969 and informed them: "I am drawing the line frankly and clearly. I say I will protect and guarantee the

the safety of everyone who is for Indonesia. I will shoot dead everyone who is against us -- and all his followers." In that case, one would think, the choice was simple. Nor was there to be a general referendum. Instead the Indonesians selected 1,o25 representatives who met in Jayapura on August 2, 1969, and duly decided unanimously to "remain with Indonesia." Afterwards one of the delegates told a Dutch reporter what had happened at the meeting:

"The man who totally destroyed my self-respect was brigadier-general Ali Murtopo, publicly acknowledged as being the chief brainwasher. For two hours this special envoy of president Suharto spoke to us. He destroyed any will we may have had to vote against integrating with Indonesia. He began by pointing out that Indonesia, as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia, is able to strike fear into any country. Jakarta was not interested in us Papuans but in West Irian as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could find us an island in the Pacific where we could emigrate. We could also write to the Americans. They had already set foot on the moon and perhaps they would be good enough to find a place for us there. This was not all. General Murtopo impressed upon us that 115 million Indonesians had fought for West Irian for years. They had made many sacrifices in this struggle, and they would not therefore allow their national aspirations to be crossed by a handful of Papuans. Short shrift would be made of those who voted against Indonesia. Their accursed tongues would be torn out, their full mouths would be wrenched open. Upon them would fall the vengeance of the Indonesian people, among them general Murtopo who would himself shoot the people on the spot."

The Act of Free Choice was an obvious fraud, but it was nonetheless formally acknowledged by the UN General Assembly on November 19, 1969, and henceforth West Papua ceased to occupy the attention of the world community. Today, West Papua is Indonesia's 26th province known as Irian Jaya, and the process of Indonesianization continues with a large-scale program of transmigration as an important part. During the 1980s, more than one million Indonesians are to be relocated from over-populated Java to West Papua, thus making the one million Papuans a second-class minority in their own country.

The Papuans did not remain passive in the face of all this: in 1965, they formed the Free Papua Movement (OPM, Organisasi Papua Merdeka), in Indonesia known as GPL (Gerakan Pengacau Liar), an acronym which stands for "wild terrorist gangs." For 2o years, the OPM has been waging a war of liberation even though few people outside know about it and with hardly any outside support. It is a struggle with bow and arrow against a modern military machine but nonetheless Indonesia is still not in control of the entire country. The human cost of the occupation is staggering: at least 15o,ooo people have died since 1962 as a result of war, starvation and disease. As a further result of the war, many Papuans are fleeing across the border into neighbouring Papua New Guinea, where there is much sympathy among the population whereas the government is afraid to support them for fear of reprisals from Indonesia. And with good reason:

In March 1984, for instance, Indonesian military aircraft violated PNG territory and flew low over Green River region intimidating the inhabitants even as the Danish foreign minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was holding talks with general Suharto. During an interview with Danish television the foreign minister explained that he had not gone there to teach the Indonesians how to run their own country, adding that some countries try to "work things out in a reasonable manner," and that in his opinion, "Indonesia is reasonably stable politically." But refugees from West Papua and citizens of PNG may find it hard to agree with the minister's view that Indonesia tries to "work things out in a reasonable manner."[10] So may the people of East Timor to which we now turn.

6. East Timor: Background, civil war and invasion

Timor is an island about 5oo kilometres north of Australia. The first European settlement was established by the Portuguese in 1566 but they soon faced competition from the Dutch. By a treaty of 1859 (further revised in 19o4), the two powers agreed to divide the island between them so that the western part became a Dutch and the eastern part a Portuguese colony. When Indonesia gained independence in 1949, West Timor became part of the new republic.

East Timor covers 18,988 square kilometres including the enclave Oecusse in West Timor and the little island Atauro off the northern coast. Except for a few thousand persons of Chinese, European and mixed ancestry, the population is of Timorese origin. Though Portuguese was until recently the official language, several indigenous languages are spoken of which tetum is the most important. Many Timorese follow traditional religions, though about 5o per cent of the population are Roman Catholic. The figure may be rising right now since joining the Catholic Church is one of the few legal ways of expressing your opposition to the authorities (just as in Poland). In 1974, the last year before the Indonesian invasion, the population was estimated at about 67o,ooo with a literacy rate of only lo per cent and fewer than lo (ten!) Timorese holding university degrees. 4oo years of Portuguese colonialism had not brought much progress to the Timorese people.

In 191o, there was a large-scale rebellion which was defeated only when two Portuguese warships arrived from Lisbon and Mozambique in August 1912. Over 3,ooo Timorese were killed and 4,ooo captured for their role in the rebellion. Otherwise, East Timor presented few military problems. In 1928, for instance, there were only 2oo Portuguese civilians and 3oo soldiers to govern the colony. During World War Two, Timor became the scene of heavy fighting although Portugal itself was neutral. Allied troops were landed in 1942 and 2o,ooo Japanese soldiers occupied the island. The East Timorese supported the Allies and, after their withdrawal in 1943, continued the resistance on their own, paying a heavy price: The Australians lost 4o out of 4oo, while the East Timorese lost more than 40,000. Official figures show that the population of East Timor actually declined during the period 1930-1946 from 472,000 to 433,000. For this reason, many Australians still feel that they owe the East Timorese a special debt and ought to support them now in their struggle against the Indonesian invaders.

Thus, East Timor was never a part of Indonesia or the Dutch East Indies. The Indonesian Republic which was proclaimed in 1945 never laid any claim to East Timor, nor did it challenge Portuguese colonial rule in the territory at the United Nations or elsewhere. On the contrary, during the 1950s and 1960s when Indonesia was pressing hard its claim to West Papua, it made a point of denying any interest in this Portuguese-held territory and insisted that its claim to West Papua was based on the territory's former position within the Dutch East Indies. Speaking in 1960 during the general debate at the General Assembly's fifteenth session, the then foreign minister of Indonesia, Mr. Subandrio, declared that "Indonesia explicitly does not make any claim at all to territory such as that in Borneo or Timor which lies within the Indonesian archipelago but was not part of the Netherlands East Indies." This position was restated by Mr. Subandrio the following year: "As regards one half of the island of Timor, which is Portuguese, we have no territorial claims at all." And again in 1962, the Indonesian representative, Mrs. Supeni, said that "we are not ..... laying claim to the other part of the island of Timor, which is now under Portuguese rule, despite the fact that the people of that territory belong to the same racial stock as we do."[11]

Many years later, on June 17, 1974, the Indonesian newspaper Sinar Harapan quoted the then foreign minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, as saying: "We will support Portuguese Timor if its own people wants to obtain their independence..... Indonesia will give guarantees of not interfering in the determination of the future of Portuguese Timor." And on the very same day, José Ramos Horta, an East Timorese nationalist who was then visiting Jakarta (and who is presently the East Timor representative at the UN), received an official letter from Malik where he stated the three principles to which the government of Indonesia adhered:

"I. The independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people ~~of East Timor~~ in Timor.

"II. The government as well as the people of Indonesia have no intention to increase or to expand their territory, or to occupy other territories other (than) what is stipulated in their constitution. This reiteration is to give you a clear idea, so that there may be no doubt in the minds of the people of Timor in (expressing) their own wishes.

"III. For this reason, whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence, can be assured that the government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and co-operation for the benefit of both countries."

Even as late as September lo, 1975, on the occasion of the installation of 2, Indonesia's ~~[illegible]~~ first ambassador to Papua New Guinea, president Suharto insisted that his country had no territorial designs on Portuguese Timor. Equal rights must be granted to all forces in the colony to enable them to express their wishes free from 2✓ pressure, Suharto said in a speech that was broadcast over the radio. But all this was only propaganda for public consumption. The truth was rather different.[12]

In April 1974, the fascist government of Portugal was overthrown and this opened up new possibilities for a free political development. Contrary to ~~[illegible]~~ what had happened in Portugal's African colonies -- Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau -- there had not been any armed guerilla struggle in East Timor, but during the month of May three important political parties were quickly formed:

APODETI, Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense, The Popular Democratic Association of Timor, in favour of integration with Indonesia.

UDT, União Democrática Timorense, The Democratic Union of Timor, in favour of independence after a long period of ~~[illegible]~~ transition.

ASDT, Associacão Social Democrática Timor, The Social Democratic Association of Timor, which in September 1974 changed into FRETILIN, Frente Revolucionário do Timor Leste Independente, The Revolutionary Front of an Independent East Timor, in favour of an immediate independence.

According to foreign observers, the conservative APODETI had support from a mere five per cent of the population. The liberal UDT,which initially was regarded as the most influential, had by early 1975 dropped to about 25 per cent, while FRETILIN stood at around 6o per cent. Fretilin had called for the rejection of colonialism and racial discrimination and demanded the right to independence, immediate participation in local government and a campaign against corruption. Moreover, it had launched an education program and introduced production co-operatives together with some preliminary measures of land reform: obviously a program that was very popular among the East Timorese.

The new Portuguese government started negotiations for a decolonization at once, but its attention was primarily directed towards the African colonies where problems seemed to be more pressing than in quiet East Timor, and consequently time went by without any effective arrangements being made for the Asian colony on the other side of the globe. Meanwhile, Indonesia started its unofficial and covert operation to take over. At first, they put their trust in APODETI. But this marginal group was never a credible vehicle for Indonesia's ambitions and it was soon dropped in favour of the UDT. In August 1975, this party staged a coup, probably with Indonesian complicity, setting off a bloody civil war that ended a few weeks later in a complete victory for Fretilin. The UN study Decolonization estimated the numbers killed at 2-3,ooo. The figure and the time are worth noting, as the American scholar Noam Chomsky has pointed out, since the U.S.,after reports of later Indonesian atrocities began to surface,has tried to claim that many of those killed were victims of the civil war and not of the Indonesian invasion.[13]

During the civil war, the Portuguese administration fled from the island, retreating to Ataurо, and from September to December 1975 Fretilin had de facto control of the entire country, except for some areas along the Indonesian borderline. Foreign visitors during this period confirmed that the civil war was over and that Fretilin seemed to enjoy support from the majority of the population. Also during this period, the Portuguese flag was still flying in East Timor and Fretilin repeatedly called on the Portuguese governor to return to the capital, Dili, and resume the process of decolonization -- but all to no avail. By now, however, Indonesia no longer limited itself to verbal propaganda against Fretilin and economic support for its collaborators in East Timor: it started a series of armed attacks across the border from West Timor as early as August 1975. Fretilin defended itself as best it could and appealed to the outside world to stop the Indonesians, but no one responded: technically speaking, East Timor was still a colony and the responsibility belonged to Portugal which did nothing. In this situation, Fretilin decided to declare independence, and on November 28, 1975, the Democratic Republic of East Timor was proclaimed. However, only a few days later, on December 7, the Indonesian attacks culminated in a massive invasion of Dili from land, sea and air, involving eventually more than 20,000 troops.

Fretilin withdrew to the mountains (where most of the Timorese have always lived) and from there began a protracted war of resistance aganist the foreign invaders, while Indonesia, for its part, isolated the island from the outside world so that no one could get in (with any help for Fretilin) or get out (with any reports on the situation). But even so the occupation army faced fierce opposition from the native population and to this day the war continues.

On May 31, 1976, in an attempt to give the operation an appearence of "legality," the Indonesians convened a "Popular Representative Assembly" with 37 members in Dili, which duly decided uanimously to integrate with Indonesia. It was a replica of what had taken place in Jayapura on August 2, 1969, and with about as little legitimacy as the earlier event. On July 17, 1976, president Suharto signed the bill of integration, and East Timor became from then on Indonesia's 27th province.

7. The struggle against Indonesian occupation

At first, though, Suharto did not control much of his 27th province: only the biggest towns and the main roads between them, i.e. only 2o per cent of the country and lo per cent of the population. Transport from one town to another was not safe unless under armed escort and even then not always. In March 1977, 16 months after the invasion, a spokesman of the U.S. State Department estimated that only 2oo,ooo of the 65o,ooo people could "be considered in areas under Indonesian administration." And since the U.S. supports Jakarta, this spokesman is not likely to exaggerate in favour of Fretilin. In that year, however, Indonesia received and introduced military equipment that was much more efficient and suitable for their purposes: counter-insurgency warfare. As Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong has put it in their recent and valuable book:

"Indeed 1978 was the most difficult year in the liberation struggle of the Maubere people. (Maubere is a common name, held in contempt in colonial days; Fretilin adopted it as the name for the people of East Timor, thus turning contempt into pride). The deliberate campaign of starvation, the relentless aerial bombardments, the destruction of the agricultural system brought untold suffering for the Timorese people. Despite the resistance movement's successes in the early stages of the encirclement and annihilation campaign, which thwarted the Indonesian advance in the west for a while, the steady onslaught from land, sea and air brought most of the country under Indonesian military control.

"The resistance movement was in disarray, its lines of communication disrupted. Many Fretilin leaders had been killed or captured, or had surrendered in the face of tremendous odds. Under these pressures, difficulties began to emerge within the Fretilin leadership. Already in 1975, Xavier do Amaral, the president, had suggested that contact be made with the Indonesians. The conflict intensified as the war escalated and when it was discussed in May 1977 a split occurred within the Fretilin Central Committee. Amaral was removed as president and held in custody. In August 1978, during an Indonesian attack in Viqueque near the south coast, Amaral's guards were captured. He himself escaped arrest but then surrendered to the Indonesians a few days later and was one of the few members of the old Fretilin leadership not killed after surrendering. He became the personal captive of his former enemy, brigadier-general Dading Kalbuadi, working as his gardener and stableboy, first in Bali, and when Dading was promoted to the top leadership of the armed forces in 1983, Amaral was taken to Jakarta.

"A month after Amaral's surrender, Alarico Fernandes, Fretilin's minister of information and security, who was responsible for Radio Maubere, agreed to collaborate with the Indonesian intelligence in their Operation Skylight aimed at persuading Fretilin leaders to surrender. In September 1978, he announced his own breakaway from the Fretilin leadership and surrendered. As a result, Fretilin's radio communication with the outside world was severed. While Fernandes may have expected some reward from his former enemies, circumstances turned out to be even less favourable for him than for Amaral, and his wife and daughter were raped by Indonesian soldiers in his presence. He was later exiled on the Indonesian island of Sumba. All the others who surrendered with him were executed.

"Towards the end of 1978, the fragile lines of communication between guerilla units in various parts of the country disintegrated. Indonesian military efforts were concentrated on the capture of Nicolau Lobato, who had taken over from Amaral as president of Fretilin and commander of Falintil (Fretilin's armed forces). To this end, general Yusuf whisked his 2,500 strong elite troops from place to place by helicopter. On December 31, his tactics proved successful, for a unit led by lieutenant Prabowo (who later became Suharto's son-in-law) killed the Fretilin president in a battle in the Maubisse area, some 50 miles south of Dili. Prabowo was immediately promoted to the rank of captain, and general Yusuf flew to Dili to inspect the body of Fretilin's fallen leader; a photograph of him beside Lobato's body was widely published in the Indonesian press. In a press conference, general Yusuf announced that 4/ the "rebel forces" in East Timor had ceased to exist. Although the Indonesian generals continued to make similar claims, subsequent events proved them wrong."[14]

Almost miraculously, Fretilin was able to re-organize and ~~[illegible]~~ reconstitute their forces under the leadership of José Alexandro Gusmão, known as Xanana. In June 1980, for instance, they attacked Indonesia's television transmitter in Dili and several 5 military targets in an operation which rattled Indonesian authorities since they had considered this a safe area.[15] Even more astounding, in March 1983, the Indonesian commander in East Timor, colonel Purwanto, entered into official negotiations with Xanana who demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Indonesian troops and a UN-supervised act of self-determination. A ceasefire came into effect. It was not, however, to last very long for in that same month, general Benny Murdani (who had been responsible for planning and commanding the 1975 invasion) became commander-in-chief of Indonesia's armed forces, and he favoured a rather different ~~different~~ line of approach. In June 1983, after news of the talks had broken in the international press, Purwanto was sacked and Murdani sent a confidential warning to Xanana:

"Don't think that you can entangle yourself. Do not think that you can receive assistance from other countries. There is no country on this globe that can help you. Our own army is prepared to destroy you if you are not willing to be co-operative with our republic. We are preparing an operation -- Operasi Persatuan (Operation Unity) -- which will come into force in August."

In July, facilities that had been given to the International Red Cross to undertake relief activities were withdrawn making it impossible for the agency to continue the main aspects of their work in East Timor, and in that same month Murdani visited East Timor together with four top-level generals: ~~[illegible]~~ something dramatic was certainly about to happen, and so it did: On August 16, 1983, Murdani made a public threat to wipe out ~~Fretilin resistance if they~~ the Fretilin resistance if they ignored his call to surrender: "This time, no more fooling around. We are going to hit them without mercy," he said, adding that 'if this call goes unheeded, the government will use its armed forces and all its arsenal to clean up the remnants of 6 Fretilin rebels." And soon a new military offensive swept the ~~hills~~ hills and mountains of East Timor.[16]

But in spite of repeated Indonesian propaganda claims, the existence and efficiency of the resistance movement are incontrovertible facts. Beginning in 1983, Fretilin re-established contact with the outside world and a wealth of written material and pictures were smuggled out of the country. In May 1985, Abilio Araujo, leader of Fretilin's external delegation, told a news conference in Lisbon that a guerilla radio began transmitting from East Timor in January that year. He said the radio, smuggled into the former colony in 1984, had a range of 1,600 kilometres and could reach Australia and neighbouring nations. He also distributed texts of broadcasts which he said were made earlier that year over the radio. The 17 texts detailed Fretilin attacks since August 1983 and accused Indonesian forces of killing, torturing and imprisoning civilians.[17] And quite apart from Fretilin's own claims, its successes are documented by secret as well as public statements from the invaders themselves. In addition to what we have already noted, let us here single out five recent examples:

D 1. In December 1982, Fretilin captured a set of secret instructions on counter-insurgency operations issued to the Indonesian troops in 1982. In one of these documents, dealing with the interrogation of prisoners, we find the following candid relections: "Hopefully, interrogation accompanied by the use of violence will not take place except in certain circumstances when the person being interrogated is having difficulty telling the truth (is evasive).

"If it proves necessary to use violence, make sure there are no people around ..... to see what is happening, so as not to arouse people's antipathy..... Avoid taking photographs showing torture in progress (people being photographed at times when they are being subjected to electric current, when they have been stripped naked, etc.). Remember not to have such photographic documentation developed outside, ... which could then be made available to the public by irresponsible elements.

"It is better to make attractive photographs, such as shots taken while eating together with the prisoner, or shaking hands with those who have just come down from the bush, showing them in front of a house, and so on. If such photos are circulated in the bush, this is a classic way of assuredly undermining their morale and fighting spirits. And if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the church into supporting operations to restore security."

No wonder, then, that Indonesian officials denied outright the authenticity of these revealing documents, when they were made publicly available in the west. The documents have been authenticated by Amnesty International as well as TAPOL in London, 3/ the British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia.[18]

2. In January 1983, colonel Purwanto explained the problems Indonesia faced to a visiting group of 24 Indonesian journalists: "It is indeed difficult. There are many risks when a village of, say, 3oo inhabitants is guarded by only two security troops, and even more so when these remnants merge with their relatives making it very difficult to identify the rebels. The troops don't know who they should be pursuing. They cannot be crushed in the way the PLO struggle was ended in Lebanon. Nor can they be rounded up in operations such as were launched during Operation *Ganesha* (of 1981). From my childhood days, I have been known as a fierce person. But these Fretilin remnants cannot be crushed by fierce methods. They can only be dealt with by cajolement."

This policy of cajolement was part of a strategy which he described as "a kind of fortess system, like during the Diponegoro war, building up settlements as forts to encircle the GPK." This frank admission of Indonesian failure makes it understandable why Purwanto only two months later decided to conclude his armistice agreement with Xanana. The GPK, to which he referred, stands for *Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, or "security disrupter gangs," and is the term officially used in Indonesia for Fretilin. The Diponegoro war, also mentioned by Purwanto, was fought by the Dutch colonial army against the mass-based Prince Diponegoro rebellion in Central 9/ Java in the late 182os. His comparison with Dutch colonial military strategy is an interesting give-away.[19]

3. In December 1983, Benny Murdani travelled to East Timor. He is a Catholic in contrast to most Indonesians who are Muslims. Speaking on Christmas night to troops, religious leaders of the community and local officials in Dili, he called upon everyone in the hills, the forests, the caves, and the towns to halt their efforts and to surrender to the authorities. "As commander of the armed forces, I give a guarantee that all those who declare that they have stopped carrying out such condemnable actions will be well treated, will be humanely treated," he said with great emphasis. And in an obvious effort to bolster up army morale, he added that "each noble and glorious task entrusted to members of the armed forces is never free of suffering and sacrifice..... I am quite certain that the great hardship of not being with your families, because you have been entrusted with this great and glorious task for the nation and the state, can console you and strengthen your convictions."

The fact that the commander-in-chief should travel to East Timor during Christmas time and speak publicly in this way, only four months after having promised to show
0 "no mercy," is a clear token that he was confronted by a well-organized and powerful adversary.[20]

4. In July 1984, Murdani held a ceremony in Dili, expressing condolences to the widows of Indonesian soldiers killed during the war in East Timor. Many widows were brought to Dili and Baucau for the occasion, when Murdani declared that the graves of troops killed in action would be kept in East Timor as "a monument to their sacrifice." He was quoted in the Indonesian press as saying that "security has been restored in this territory, and we have been able to paralyse the threat to the foundations of the Indonesian people." The team of generals who accompanied him on this visit to Dili, which was the second visit in a month, included the very top brass: nearly a dozen high-ranking officers from all the armed forces. Such a senior team of officers could only be explained by the importance which he attached to the military
1 operations then under way in his desperate attempt to put an end to continued resistance to Indonesian rule in East Timor.[21]

5. In December 1984, Murdani gave an interview to Reuters in which he admitted that resistance fighters and their supporters in the bush totalled about lo,ooo people and that they "never fight in one group ..... (but) in splinters." He also admitted that the war could not be ended in one or two years: "I'm not saying there's no end in sight but it will take some time to resolve," adding that Indonesian troops were being ambushed "once in a while;" that "some of our weapons, ammo, gets into their hands;" that Indonesia had more than 7,ooo troops in East Timor, and that Indonesian air force jets were carrying out bombing runs though this "did not happen regularly." Although the interview was given to a foreign news agency, it was clearly directed among others at critics within the army who had become impatient with Murdani's inability to crush the resistance in East Timor despite all the blustering threats he had made. He concentrated on trying to explain why it was taking so long to defeat Fretilin and claimed, quoting U.S. general Westmoreland's dictum, that Indonesia must struggle to win "the hearts and minds of the people."[22] 2/

But perhaps what Indonesia has done in East Timor is not exactly what it takes to win "the hearts and minds of the people." Let us now review some of the results of Jakarta's aggression.

8. Violations of human rights

East Timor has suffered tremendously since the Indonesian invasion of 1975. Numerous people have lost their lives as a result og war, starvation and disease, though there are no reliable statistics, and for those living, fundamental human rights have been violated on a scale that surpasses most dictatorships. In 1977, the then foreign minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, estimated the number killed as "5o,ooo or 8o,ooo." But, he added soothingly, "What does this mean if compared with 6oo,ooo who want to join Indonesia? Then what is the big fuss? It is possible that they may have been killed by the Australians and not us. Who knows? It was war."[23] 3/

Since the late 197os, the figure most widely accepted is 2oo,ooo, a figure that has been confirmed by msgr. Martinhu da Costa Lopes, the former bishop in Dili, in 1983. Using official Indonesian figures, we find a loss of about 158,ooo. Using church figures, the decline is anything between 199,ooo and 329,ooo. Be that as it may, the new offensive launched by Indonesia in August 1983 means that the figure of 2oo,ooo will soon have to be revised upwards, making East Timor the country that has suffered the second largest number of deaths in all wars currently raging world-wide, after the Kampuchea conflict, according to the Washington-based Centre for Defense Information, headed by rear admiral Gene R. LaRocque (retired) of the U.S. navy.[24]

4

In the summer of 1981, the Regional People's Representative Assembly of East Timor sent a report to president Suharto. Dated Dili, June 3, 1981, it was secret but nevertheless leaked to the Australian press a few months later. It was quoted by Robin Osborne in The Australian (October 9, 1981) and the complete text together with the covering letter later appeared in TAPOL Bulletin, published by TAPOL in London (no. 47, September 1981). One central conclusion in this report is that "after five years of integration, the people of East Timor do not yet enjoy the freedom that humanity needs to feel." This Regional Assembly has been set up by the Indonesians themselves and this means that this criticism gains more importance and credibility coming as it does from supporters and not from opponents of the Jakarta government.

The report starts by praising integration: "Throughout the centuries this people will be forever indebted and grateful for the achievement of integration of East Timor into the fold of the motherland, the great Republic of Indonesia." But after this (obligatory?) opening they strike a different tune: some of the Indonesian soldiers and officials are alleged to have "introduced behaviour that can only be described as being the behaviour of conquerors towards a conquered people." They act "with great brutality" and they "abuse the powers vested in the positions." It is with great sorrow, the text continues, that the Assembly repeatedly is receiving "verbal as well as written reports or complaints from the people about torture, maltreatment, murders and other unimaginable cases." And then follow a series of examples documenting this claim.

It is not only breaches of the law that are being criticized, however. There are also problems in the realm of the economy: "Although quite a lot of financial assistance for the purposes of building up the economy has been received, the people of East Timor have not yet felt any real benefits....." Indonesian officials are accused of lining their own pockets, and the result is that "after five years of integration and ceaseless efforts by both the central government and the regional government, the vast majority of the people are not yet able to enjoy stable living conditions." In this way, the report ~~[illegible]~~ confirms many of the charges which ~~[illegible]~~ had been put forward for several years by the foreign delegation of Fretilin as well as by independent organisations and individual specialists. Indonesia has always rejected such charges as evil-minded propaganda and they ~~[illegible]~~ did not comment on the report, but this is not to say that they did not take any action. ~~[illegible]~~ In late 1981, the two signatories of the report -- Mr. Leandro Isaac and Mr. Suosa 5 Soares -- were arrested, ~~[illegible]~~ re-emerging one month after to swear the document was a fake. Obviously, they had been forced to recant.[25]

In order to separate the resistance from the people, almost the entire Timorese population was, at an early date, herded into so-called "resettlement areas," and a recent Indonesian press report shows that this line of policy continues: 4oo strategic villages are being set up and will be located "in areas which can be easily supervised and patrolled." The Timorese puppet governor of the 27th province, Mario Carrascalao, said this would allow the province to solve its security problems. He explained that the project was being managed jointly by the provincial government and the armed forces.

An editorial commenting on the 4oo new strategic villages makes it clear that security restrictions are still very much in force ~~[illegible]~~ throughout East Timor. Asserting that security disorders are under control in some parts, the newspaper suggests that in such regions it was now time to lift security restrictions that were formerly needed but which can only obstruct people's participation in development activity. This would make it possible ~~[illegible]~~ to isolate those regions where Fretilin remnants still

have their networks. In fact, the reconstructed villages are clearly designed to tighten security control, not loosen it, as the newspaper recommends. They conform
6 with standard counter-insurgency techniques employed in many other countries, such as Malaya, Vietnam, Guatemala and Rhodesia, to mention just a few.㉖

Amnesty International is one of several non-governmental organisations that have followed the East Timor issue closely during recent years, and in early 1985, it submitted a formal complaint on the continuing human rights violations in East Timor to the 41st session of the UN Human Rights Commission. Noting that there was little evidence of improvement over the past year, it specifically complained about four points:

1. Limitations on access, including stringent restrictions on access by international observers and attempts to impose an embargo on information from the country. Timorese leaving to join relatives abroad are routinely warned not to reveal anything that would discredit the Indonesian occupation forces at the risk of reprisals against relatives who remain behind.

2. Detention and resettlement. Hard facts on the number of detainees is not included except for a figure of 1,5oo still being held on Atauro island. Amnesty disputes Indonesia's claims about Atauro prisoners returning to the main island saying that many persons sent back to the main island have not been allowed to return to their homes but have instead been placed in "resettlement villages," sometimes near their place of origin, sometimes far away, where they continue to face severe restrictions on freedom of movement.

3. Torture. Amnesty reiterates its complaint about the extensive use of torture by Indonesian troops. Despite Indonesian attempts to cast doubt on the authenticity of military documents issued by the Indonesian army and captured by Fretilin in 1982, which contain guidelines regarding the use of torture, AI confirms its conviction that the documents are genuine. This is reinforced by the receipt of first-hand evidence that torture has been persistently practised in East Timor. It lists three places in Dili where torture takes place and says that some people reported to have

been held in these centres have since "disappeared" and some are feared dead.

4. Extrajudicial executions. The AI submission refers to the massacre in Kraras village in August 1983, shortly after the latest Indonesian offensive began, where as many as 2oo people may have been killed. Of those who fled to the mountains to escape the killings, several were reported to have been captured and executed. Other massacres recorded by Amnesty are: the massacre of some 1oo men captured near the village of Hau Ba in the western sector in March 1984, and killings of a number of people near Ainaro in March 1984 and in Baucau in May 1984 of people suspected of being in contact with Fretilin.

Amnesty International has planned a campaign on the East Timor issue, due to run world-wide from the summer of 1985.

9. Foreign visitors

Even a rare foreign visitor who is given a carefully guided tour may occasionally catch a glimpse of the grim reality and record some of the absurd conditions under which he (or she) is working. For almost two years after the invasion, the country was closed to the foreign press, a sure sign of Indonesian failure, but in the summer of 1977, Richard Carleton of the British *Observer* became the first independent reporter to travel in East Timor, where an eyewitness gave him a gruesome account of the invasion in 1975 -- in secret: "I saw at least 15o people lined up on the wharf and shot. It took about 4o minutes. As each shot was fired, a body fell into the water and they all eventually floated out to sea." Carleton explains that the "helicopters supplied to transport me were under instructions to fly above 3,ooo feet, beyond the range of small arms fire," adding that "everywhere the Indonesians took me they had three guards always within earshot and two concentric circles of 'civil defence' troops surrounding me. They claimed that this was not to restrict my movements but rather to protect me." And Carleton is no Fretilin spokesman as is clear from his concluding paragraph where he states that "despite the brutality of the annexation, Timor may be better off in the long term within Indonesia for the territory is economically non-viable and dependent [redacted] on aid."[27]

7

In early 198o Henry Kamm, the well known reporter from the New York Times, who is quite sympathetic to the Jakarta government, explained that he had waited for two years for permission to visit and was allowed only limited freedom in travel to the interior. Major Benny Mandalika of the Indonesian military intelligence from Jakarta was always present, took notes during the interviews not only with ordinary people but also with Indonesian officials of Timorese origin and often peered openly at the notes Kamm was taking. Explaining his actions when challenged, Mandalika said: "I must stay with you so you get the right information. My boos told me to go with you wherever you go. If you interview the man in the street you may get the wrong information."[28]

8

Two years later, Roger Norland of the Philadelphia Inquirer had a similar experience: but "despite almost perpetual close monitoring by Indonesian military and civil officials," he said, "it was still possible to see obvious signs of large-scale malnutrition and disease, as well as overt oppression." Sometimes, it was possible for him to meet independently with Timorese in and out of government, with clergy of the Roman Catholic Church in the mostly Catholic province and with average Timorese from many walks of life. While many of the scores of Timorese interviewed were frankly fearful of talking, dozens did so nonetheless, saying as one did: "Please tell the world so they can help the Timorese people." At least six of those interviewed, he later learned, were summoned afterwards to military headquarters and interrogated about what they had said, often for many hours.

Norland also met with the apostolic administrator, msgr. Martinhu da Costa Lopes, widely known as the bishop, who hesitated to use the term "famine" about East Timor conditions. He preferred to say that more than half of the population in those districts where more than loo,ooo people lived had "insufficient food to maintain life," adding that hunger and malnutrition were endemic throughout the country. Other clergymen stated the case more strongly: "If you quote me as saying this, I'll be killed," said one who was recently in the eastern part of the province. "Famine is always a relative term, and there is hunger and malnutrition all over the country, but it is truly a famine in this region" of Baucau and Viqueque.

On a trip to a resettlement village called Saburia, about 3o miles south of the capital, Norland looked into one of the corrugated tin houses the Indonesian authorities had built for people resettled from the mountains: "Bernardo, 56, who lives with his wife and his ten-year-old son, sat on the bare dirt floor of his house, which was devoid of possessions of any kind. There was also no sign of food in the house. Asked how the harvest had been, he surveyed the circle of officials and, after a long pause, said: "There is not enough to eat." In the next house, Thomas Ferreria, the family spokesman was asked ~~[illegible]~~ through an interpreter about his family's condition.

"Tell him," major Marsidik warned Ferreria in Indonesian, "that it is okay here."

Ferreria did as he was told.

"So even though the crops are bad, you have enough food for the whole family?" he was asked, in English.

"Tell him you have enough until the next rainy season," said Marsidik in Indonesian.

"We have enough until the next rainy season," Ferreria said.

One day, Norland sneaked away from his ~~[illegible]~~ guides and went to the Lahane neighbourhood of Dili, where hundreds of families have been forced to live in temporary huts along the steep banks of a mountain stream, and made a depressing discovery: of 22 children under the age of 12, whose body ~~[illegible]~~ weights and measurements were taken with no officials present, 18 were proved to be chronically malnourished, according to standards adopted by the UN World Health Organisation.

One evening, a young Timorese man fell quickly into step with Norland on Dili's Rua Antonio de Carvalho: "We are not allowed to speak to foreigners," he said, "but I just want to tell you. Before, we had Portuguese colonialism. Now, we have Indonesian colonialism."

Norland's report from East Timor and other parts of Southeast Asia won him the
9 George Polk Awards for Journalism in 1983, and rightly so. It did not, however, win him another invitation from the Indonesians![29]

CIIR, the London-based Catholic Institute for International Relations, is one group which did not make it to East Timor. In February 1982, ~~the~~ they published a pamphlet on the conflict which was quoted with approval in the London Times (February 24, 1982). Two months later, the Indonesian embassy in London responded by inviting the CIIR to send a delegation to East Timor. CIIR accepted the offer and began making preparations to fund a visit for several British visitors accompanied by a translator. This visit was to take place in July the following year. In April 1983, CIIR gave the embassy a list of the names of the people who had agreed to visit East Timor and set out the schedule for a visit beginning on July 25. Collectively, the group had technical experience of health care, agriculture and government, a personal knowledge of both East Timor and Indonesia, and the ability to communicate in Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese and three local languages. But when July arrived, the CIIR was informed by the embassy that they could not arrange a visit for them, owing to the lack of time. Instead, the embassy suggested, they might visit in October 1983, but this was impossible to accept because several members of the group already had other engagements at that period. Commented Robert Archer of the CIIR:

"We feel it should be made quite clear that shortage of time cannot be a good reason for not confirming our visit. The Indonesian authorities have had 14 months' warning of a visit which they invited us to make in the first place. Nor is the group politically contentious. Refusal to confirm this invitation must support the view of those who believe that the Indonesian government does not want independent, well-prepared visits to East Timor, especially by people who know the country, have technical skills and speak the local languages. We regret greatly that on this occasion the Indonesian authorities still seem able to engage only in one-way dialogue."[30]

Undaunted, the CIIR went ahead and published a new edition of their pamphlet in March ~~1983~~ 1985, a brief but accurate account of the conflict, based on a wide range of sources but -- for obvious reasons -- not on personal observations.

In February 1985, a five-man delegation from the West German parliament, led by social democrat Hans-Ulrich Klose, visited East Timor, the first group of West European parliamentarians to do so. The delegation included two social democrats, two christian democrats and a liberal. Deputy Klose, who is in charge of human rights affairs for the social democratic party, told the press he met prisoners on Atauro island who had been detained for five years without having access to any legal aid or to any state authority. The delegation called on the Indonesian government to dissolve the Atauro prison camp as soon as possible and to allow all the detainees there to return to their places of origin without delay. "Generally speaking, the whole island appears to be under arrest," Klose stated, calling on the Indonesian government to allow free access to the international community and the foreign press so as to enable people to assess the situation for themselves.[31]

One month later, three more reporters were allowed in: Peter Millership of Reuters, Steven Jones of the *Wall Street Journal* and Ghafur Fadyl of the Associated Press. The trip was timed to coincide with the 41st session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, so that the Indonesian delegation there could argue that foreign observers were indeed being allowed in. But they were not, however, allowed to see anything for themselves, as Steven Jones explained in his report: "We are here on this government-sponsored visit to see that peace has returned to the eastern end of the island and that prosperity lies on the horizon." As always, the Indonesians stage-managed the trip, preventing the journalists from seeing anything of value: "Reporters flitting from place to place by helicopter are unable to gauge accurately the level of fighting," Jones complained. "Although Indonesia says there are 7,000 soldiers in East Timor, few of them are visible. The armed police officers who meet us at every stop are said to be there to foil would-be kidnappers. And although the journalists are aware that there is a military air base near Baucau, our pilots fly us out to sea when we leave the town, precluding even a glimpse of the airfield. A priest in one village says that two armored troop carriers that usually rumble over village roads have been hidden from view."[32]

And so the pattern continues. But let us now turn to the international perspectives.

lo. The western democracies: The United States and Britain

Responsibility for what has happened to East Timor lies, of course, primarily with the Indonesian military regime, but also with the western democracies which have ~~xxxx~~ constantly and increasingly provided military, economic and diplomatic support for ~~Kakxxxx~~ Jakarta, and with the western press that (with few exceptions) covered up the issue for four years and since then has reported the story from time ~~xxxxxx~~ to time while still generally ignoring the crucial role of the western countries. Several western governments knew of Indonesia's plans long before the invasion but did nothing to stop it, on the contrary they seemed to give them the green light. In July 1975, for instance, the British ambassador to Jakarta wrote that "the people of Portuguese Timor are in no condition to exercise the right of self-determination." He continued:

"Though it still remains in [illegible] clear of becoming involved in (the) future, developments in [illegible] result in [illegible] greater sympathy towards Indonesia, should the [illegible] forced to take strong action by the deteriorating situation in [illegible] seen from here, it is in Britain's interest [illegible] as soon and as unobtrusively as possible. If it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the United Nations, we should keep our heads down and [illegible] against the Indonesians."

Similarly, the Australian ambassador [illegible] reported in August 1975 that he had spoken with his American [illegible] attitude is that the U.S. should ..... allow events to [illegible] cynical comment to me was that if the Indonesians [illegible] (i.e. the U.S.) would hope

3/ that they would do so [illegible]!" All this, of course, hidden from the [illegible]

The invasion itself began immediately [illegible] President Ford and Henry Kissinger had concluded an official visit [illegible] asked to comment afterwards, Ford smiled and said: "We'll talk [illegible]" while Kissinger, for his part, told a reporter that "the United States [illegible] Indonesia's position on the question" of East Timor. These frank reactions were reported in the Los Angeles Times

(December 7, 1975), the *Boston Globe* (December 8, 1975) and the *Christian Science* 4/ *Monitor* (January 28, 1976), but apart from these references, they appear to have been effectively suppressed in the media.[34]

One month later, in January 1976, a State Department official declared that "in terms of the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Indonesia, we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor," adding that "the United States wants to keep 5/ its relations with Indonesia close and friendly. We regard Indonesia as a friendly, non-aligned nation -- a nation we do a lot of business with."[35] And this line of reasoning has been followed by all succeeding presidents, including the alleged human rights crusader Jimmy Carter whose vice-president Walter Mondale travelled to Jakarta in May 1978 to finalize details of the sale of 16 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft to Indonesia. Even as the war was raging in East Timor, Mondale felt able to commend the rulers of Indonesia on their human rights record because they had at last decided to implement a program to release tens of thousands of political prisoners (*tapols*) who had been held for nearly 13 years without trial. "Warplanes have been bartered for political 6/ prisoners," wrote the *TAPOL Bulletin* in June 1978, while "Indonesia's embattled democratic opposition has been forgotten" and "East Timor is ignored."[36]

The current U.S. president Ronald Reagan professes to be very concerned with military rule (as in Poland), violations of human rights (as in Nicaragua) and invasions of foreign countries (as the USSR in Afghanistan). On December 23, 1981, for instance, he made a moving Christmas speech, broadcast on nationwide radio and television, where he said: "Make no mistake, their crime will cost them dearly," and asked: "How can they possibly justify using naked force to crush a people who ask for nothing more than the right to lead their own lives in freedom and dignity?" Indeed a relevant question, not only for Poland (that Reagan was discussing here) but also for East Timor. However, when president Suharto arrived in Washington for an official visit lo months later, Reagan chose a rather different set of words:

At the arrival ceremony on October 12, 1982, Reagan assured Suharto that "your views on world affairs carry special authority and add special meaning to our discussions today. Your viewpoints and wise counsel will be greatly appreciated."

He further stated that "I know of the great strides made by Indonesia in national building under your leadership," adding that "no nation in our era has shown itself more firmly committed to preserving its own independence than Indonesia, and yet, no nation has pursued that goal in a more responsible manner." Talking about the two countries, Reagan claimed that "both strive for world peace" and that "the United States regards Indonesia as an important force for peace, stability and progress." Finally, the president promised that "the United States will also continue to provide appropriate development and food assistance in the framework of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). I am proud to say that this consortium has had wholehearted American backing since its founding."

Not much concern here that Suharto is the president of a military regime that violates human rights and invades foreign countries. The victims of the death squads, in West Papua and in East Timor did not appear in Regan's public speech. At a press briefing later that same day, an administration official refused to say whether they did in his private talk with Suharto and grew seemingly irritated when pressed on the subject. He repeatedly refused to say anything other than "our policy is to rely on quiet diplomacy -- this is an issue we do not bring up in public." After the briefing, a reporter shouted at the official: "Sixteen questions and no answers!" The official responded drily: "That's what I'm paid for," which is at least an honest answer, although it will hardly bring much comfort to Suharto's victims.[37]

The United Kingdom, as a former world power, has not been far behind in this matter. Although the British government does not officially condone Indonesia's annexation of East Timor and has often declared its support for the right of the people to determine their own future, free from outside pressure, it nevertheless stepped up its delivery of weapons, Hawk ground-attack aircraft and other military equipment following the commencement of Indonesia's war against East Timor in 1975. Since 1983, several ministers and senior ~~senior officials~~ officers of the British armed forces have visited Jakarta. And prime minister Margaret Thatcher's official visit to Indonesia in April 1985 came hard on the heels of a series of arms deals which had made Britain Indonesia's major source of war equipment in Western Europe. Other sources are West Germany (submarines), Holland (corvettes) and Belgium (patrol boats).

During 1984, British companies concluded deals to supply three refitted naval frigates to the Indonesian navy, to add another five Hawks to the two squadrons already delivered and to start delivery of loo million pounds worth of Rapier missiles manufactured by British Aerospace. This Rapier contract was the largest British arms deal in 1984. In a press release commenting on the Thatcher visit, TAPOL stated that "it is inexcusable for the British prime minister to turn a blind eye to the numerous human rights violations being perpetrated by Indonesia's military rulers, while boosting the sale of military hardware to Indonesia's armed forces which are responsible for so much bloodshed."[38]

11. Australia

As a result of geographical proximity and past history, there has been much interest in the East Timor issue in Australia, and it is the only western country where the press has covered the topic regularly since April 1974. But even if there was much sympathy for the people of East Timor, there was always the strategic and economic importance of Indonesia to consider, and this fact was clearly demonstrated well in advance of the Indonesian invasion. On October 16, 1975, five foreign journalists -- two Australians, two British and one New Zealander -- were killed in Balibo, a small town in East Timor near the Indonesian border. They were killed by Indonesian troops advancing into the territory in order to destabilize the Fretilin administration and to prepare for the later, full-scale invasion that was launched on December 7. But the Australian government did not really want the truth, because this would hurt the Indonesian government whose official stance was that they had never crossed the border and had no intention of ever doing so.

The Australian ambassador in Jakarta explained the case in a secret cable to Canberra, dated October 29, 1975, and later leaked to the press: "Although we know it is not true, the formal position of the Indonesian government is still that there is no Indonesian military intervention in East Timor. If the minister said or implied in public the Indonesian government was lying, we would invite a hurt and angry reaction." The ambassador's advice was taken, and Australia failed to protest to Indonesia, but the spectre of the five dead reporters continues to haunt the public debate in the country. In July 1979, for instance, the Australian weekly *The National Times* devoted lo full pages to a special report on the killing by Hamish McDonald, and in October 1981, following reports of a new Indonesian offensive, *The Australian* returned to the case in an editorial calling for "quick action on East Timor." The paper said:

"When (five) Australian journalists were murdered (in October 1975) in circumstances which the most charitable would have to have found suspicious, the best we seemed able to manage was a half apologetic mumble. It is time Australia stopped playing the role of Pontius Pilate. It is time we spoke up as loudly on nearby Indonesian colonialism as we do on the misdeeds of the distant Soviets and South Africans."

When former Australian diplomat Sir Keith Shann said of the five that "they asked for it and they got it," reaction was immediate and widespread. Critics included parliamentarians, Jim Dunn (Australian consul in East Timor 1962-64), Shirley Shackleton (widow of one of the journalists), Ronald MacDonald (chairman of the Australian section of the International Press Institute) and many others. In his recent book, Jim Dunn states that "the killing of the newsmen was probably the worst and most wanton act of its kind in the history of Australian journalism, and yet, incredibly, it evoked not a formal word of protest to Indonesia." As a matter of fact, it was later revealed that Canberra had known the truth all along because they were monitoring the Indonesian army's secret radio traffic. It was, in 9 other words, a deliberate cover-up. And to Indonesia, Canberra's silence was a clear message: it was a green light for an outright invasion of East Timor.[39]

As early as October 1976, Australia gave *de facto* recognition of the integration of East Timor, and in January 1978, a *de jure* recognition followed. In March of that year, the government announced the gift of 12 Bell Sioux helicopters, plus facilities for the training of 24 Indonesian service-men in Australia for the operation and upkeep of these aircraft. Three months later, in June, it was announced

10 that six Nomad Searchmaster planes, fitted with ground and sea surveillance radar, would be given to Indonesia, in addition to six previously donated.[4o]

The Australian Labor Party, then in opposition, reacted strongly to this line of policy and urged on by politicians as Ken Fry and Gordon McIntosh, the party adopted a platform that committed it to reverse the policy on East Timor and support the right to self-determination in international organisations such as the UN (to which we return below: section 15). However, following the change of government in March 1983, the new prime minister Bob Hawke and his foreign minister Bill Hayden set out to establish good relations with Indonesia, thus openly betraying their own party platform. Hayden put the dilemma quite clearly: if we support East Timor, he said, an Australian airline company may lose its flying rights to and through Indonesia and this will cost us 16o million Australian dollars. So the question was: how much are half a million East Timorese worth?

~~In July 1983~~ By July 1983, things got so far that a member of the cabinet, minister for defence support, Mr. Brian Howe, was gagged after having criticized government policy and had to cancel a public meeting in Melbourne where two members of Fretilin also were to speak. (during the liberal government in 1975-83, Fretilin representatives were denied visa to Australia; the Hawke government ~~issue~~ issued two visas in the summer of 1983, but the representatives would be considered private persons and Hawke himself would not meet with them). Senator Georges, who attended the rally in place of Mr. Howe, stressed the absurdity that a member of the party and of the government apparently no longer was "permitted to speak in public in support of Australian Labor Party policy," adding that "we have reached a point where we have accepted the advice of fascists in the determination of our foreign policy ..... certainly in regard to East Timor. Yet we fought against fascism, and in that fight the people of East Timor sacrificed themselves on our behalf," he said referring to East Timorese involvement in World War Two in aid of Australia. Finally, he said, it was ~~humiliating~~ "humiliating for us now to see an Australian government, a succession of Australian governments, deny the rights of the East Timorese because the fascist militarists of Indonesia demand that we do so."

But during the ALP conference of July 1984, the old platform was dropped and on the crucial issue of self-determination the new resolution went no further than to criticize Indonesia for incorporating the territory without an internationally-supervised act of self-determination. It called on the Australian government to support "international initiatives, including the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, that have the aim of achieving a settlement of the East Timorese problem," but there was no general reversal of policy. Within hours of the adoption of the ALP resolution, Bill Hayden was on his way to Jakarta to attend a "dialogue" with foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), profoundly relieved that he was taking with him a policy that Indonesian officials had already said they could "live with." Benny Murdani was less generous, however. He bluntly told the foreign minister that attempts by anyone to send a mission to investigate human rights in East Timor would be regarded as an act of interference in Indonesia's internal affairs.[41]

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All this goes to show that what you say in opposition is one thing, but what you do in government is something quite different.

12. Portugal, Holland and Sweden

As the former colonial power in East Timor, Portugal is directly involved in the issue. Technically, it is still the administering power and formally it is committed to ensure an orderly decolonization of the territory. Reality is somewhat different, though, since in the first place, Portugal has not administered anything at all after it withdrew from the main island during the civil war in August 1975, and secondly, successive Portuguese governments have done next to nothing to fulfil their constitutional obligations. Moreover, in October 1981, a secret report, declassified by president Eanes, revealed that after the April 1974 revolution, Portuguese leaders secretly negotiated with Indonesia and accommodated that country's ambitions to annex the country. According to a description of the last of these meetings, held in Hong

Kong in June 1975, a Portuguese delegation told Indonesian officials that it had drafted Timor's new decolonization statute in such a way that it would give them a year to try and persuade the population by peaceful means to accept incorporation into 2/ Indonesia. But if they did not, and Indonesia chose to use force, "the Portuguese government is not prepared to create problems, and could easily send a ship to Timor to evacuate all Portuguese."[42]

In July 1983, a new round of secret talks between Portugal and Indonesia began, this time under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General and his special deputy for East Timor affairs, the Pakistani diplomat, Achmed Rafeeuddin, who is believed to be pro-Indonesian. There are two reasons for secrecy: in the first place, it is impossible for the two countries to meet officially, since Portugal severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia immediately after the invasion (although Portuguese air force general ~~Mxxxx~~ Morais e Silva met with general Benny Murdani privately in Lisbon in January 1977, when the latter made a one-day visit -- a most intriguing venture, as Jim Dunn has rightly ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ noted: the head of Indonesian intelligence visiting a country which has severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia ~~xxxxx~~ because of a military invasion which Murdani himself had masterminded). Secondly, Indonesia claims that East Timor was properly decolonized by the act of the Popular Representative Assembly on May 31, 1976, after which it became an "internal affair" not to be discussed by outside parties.

Both of them would like to get rid of the problem, but Fretilin's unbroken resistance and the continuing international support have forced them to the negotiating table where talks so far appear to be confined to "human rights and humanitarian affairs," thus avoiding crucial question of self-determination and independence. The East Timorese, though, and Fretilin in particular, have been completely ignored. In this way, the present negotiations are ominously reminiscent of the talks between Holland and Indonesia which led to the complete sell-out of the West Papuan people in the New York Agreement of 1962, described above (section 5). A similar deal may satisfy government circles in Lisbon that the people of East Timor 3/ will be consulted by the military regime, but it is idle fancy for anyone to think that such a deal will find acceptance by the East ~~Xxxxx~~ Timorese people.[43]

As the former colonial power in Indonesia, Holland is also involved in the issue, and East Timor has been a constant focus for solidarity groups which have worked since the late 196os to expose the true nature of the Indonesian military regime. On of the climaxes was the campaign to oppose the export to Indonesia of three naval corvettes in 1979 and 198o. There has been consistent pressure in parliament on successive Dutch governments over their support for Indonesia, and a large number of Dutch parliamentarians from almost all political parties signed a joint appeal by parliamentarians from eight European Community countries calling on the governments of the Community "to work collectively for the xxxxx self-determination of the people of East Timor." This appeal, organized by TAPOL in Britain and published on July 29, 1983, was signed by 17o parliamentarians of the Community.[44]

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In January 1984, Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek paid an official visit to Jakarta, having been instructed by parliament to raise not only the issue of the deaths squads but also the offensive in East Timor and situation in West Papua with the Indonesians. In point of fact, East Timor was hardly mentioned and West Papua apparently not at all. The one issue that he did raise, namely the death squads, elicited an angry protest from Murdani who told him to stop interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs, after which van den Broek apologized for creating this impression. On his return home, the Dutch foreign minister regretted that so much attention had been given to his discussions about the killings. He had gone, he said, primarily to promote the export of corvettes and weapons in order to counter unemployment at home. Obviously, the question of human rights was not of great concern to Mr. Broek.

Nor was it to Mrs. Schoo, Dutch minister for overseas development and chairperson of the IGGI, who visited Indonesia three months later, in April 1984. At the end of her visit, she told the Indonesian press that "we have supported Indonesia for the past 2o years, and I can't see why we shouldn't be able to go on doing so for another 2o years." Although she had professed some concern for human rights prior to her departure, this was all forgotten after her return: "I don't believe in using development assistance as a sanction," she told the Dutch press. "It is one of the aims of development assistance to create a situation in which people have enough to eat, can live a healthy life and the children can go to school..... Human rights

problems prevail in all developing countries. If we use respect for human rights as a sanction, it is as if we are punishing underdeveloped countries for what is a characteristic of underdevelopment." Two months later, in June, the IGGI convened in the Hague for its annual meeting and approved aid commitments to Indonesia for the next fiscal year of 2,46o million U.S. dollars, an increase of around lo per cent above what
5/ was pledged in 1983. Indeed, respect for human rights was not to be used as a sanction.[45]

As western democracy which is not a member of NATO, Sweden has often taken a radical and independent stance in its foreign policy and did, in fact, do so with regard to East Timor in the beginning, but over the years the principled position has been steadily eroded so that by 1985, the Swedish government had come down decisively on the side of the Indonesian generals. From 1975 to 1979, Sweden supported East Timor in the UN General Assembly while at the same time selling arms (especially Bofors cannons) to the Jakarta government. This was a classic example of a double standard and the Swedish press carried satirical cartoons where crates containing arms being loaded for export to Indonesia were labeled "Long live Fretilin!" In 198o, Sweden abstained in the UN and asked to join the IGGI. Next year, when the same thing happened in the UN and Sweden joined the IGGI as an observer, the social democrats (then in opposition) protested strongly. But when the social democrats came back in government in 1982, they too abstained in the UN and did not pull out of the IGGI. Meanwhile, Swedish arms exports to Indonesia were growing by leaps and bounds, from 21 million Swedish Crowns in 198o to about 75 million in 1984.

Minister for foreign trade, Mats Hellström, who publicly supported self-determination at the international East Timor conference held in Lisbon in May 1979, has since turned his talents to explaining the wisdom of the current Swedish policy. "I think it was wrong to start an arms export to Indonesia as the liberal government did," Helström told a public meeting in November 1984. "But now we are tied by our contracts and have to complete deliveries. The contracts mean that the Swedish government must supply spare parts and replace weapons that are destroyed. It is very hard to break such contracts, but in this case we are talking about anti-aircraft cannons which are mounted on ships and as far as we know, they have not been used against the guerilla." However, his claim that Sweden is only fulfilling old contracts is simply not true. Even as Hellström spoke these words, his colleague, Birgitta Dahl, minister for energy, was getting ready to leave for Indonesia and Singapore to take part in a huge sales drive called "Technology Sweden," promoted and organized by the Swedish government. One of the companies involved was the Karlskrona shipyard which planned to sell minesweepers to Indonesia.

At the same meeting, Hellström also stated: "I will not call it a double standard that we preach disarmament while at the same time exporting arms. It is a question of conflicting aims," he explained, adding that "our policy of neutrality gains more credibility if we can produce our own weapons. Today, we are producing 7o per cent of our own weapons, which would be impossible if we did not at the same time export some. The Swedish market is too small for an arms producer. Recently, I visited Karlskoga where I was criticized by the trade union because Bofors had laid off 1,ooo persons as a result of declining demands. We have to find a middle road 6/ between the different aims." And so, it seems, in order to keep Swedish workers employed, the number of victims in East Timor will have to increase one more time.[46]

13. The Roman Catholic Church and international relief assistance

The only already existing institution not destroyed by the Indonesians ~~in East Timor~~ is the Roman Catholic Church which has a large and increasing following among the population and church leaders, such as Martinhu da Costa Lopes, are virtually the only persons that have been able to speak out unharmed against the Indonesians. Lopes, known as the bishop of Dili, was appointed apostolic administrator in 1977, at the age of 58. He complained privately to general Dading but otherwise remained silent until 1981, when he decided to speak openly and condemn the abuses at a rally of 12,ooo people. In April 1983, he was forced to resign after which he went abroad, travelling world-wide to support East Timor and giving testimony to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February 1984.

His successor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, who took over in May 1983, at the age of 35, was widely believed to be more co-operative with the Indonesians. But as early as October 1983, he delivered a sermon at Dili Cathedral in which he protested against Indonesian brutalities and condemned the many arrests being made by the Indonesian army. He was reprimanded but continued, undaunted. In a recent interview with Reuters, he revealed the existence of two mass graves where the victims of the Kraras massacre (of August 1983) are buried: "I saw the graves, the places where those people were buried. In one place about 70 and in another place, 14," he said, adding that villagers had given him a list of the victims which includes the names of teenage boys. Even for someone in his position, such courageous statements may be dangerous, a fact of which 7/ he is well aware: "I am ready to be removed," he said in July 1984, "if that is the price of defending human rights and the rights of the Timorese."[47]

While the church has given moral support to a people in distress, food and medical assistance has been provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), though not without serious and recurrent problems and restrictions. In the first place, the ICRC did not get access at all to East Timor until the fall of 1979, i.e. well after Indonesia's annihilation campaigns, and upon arrival relief workers compared conditions there with what they had seen in Biafra or Kampuchea. Secondly, in 1981, as the humanitarian situation was gradually improving, the ICRC was asked to leave again, as the Indonesians were launching a new military offensive to which they did not want any witnesses. Operations were resumed in April 1982 and again suspended in July 1983, when the preparations for the next offensive began. Thirdly, ICRC activities traditionally include prison visitations, but this was not permitted until early 1982 when the ICRC visited Atauro island and started a food and medical program for prisoners there. This program has not been affected by developments on the main island since then.

In a rare and remarkable gesture, the ICRC has complained in public about Indonesian restrictions. The president of the ICRC, Mr. Alexandre Hay, has drawn attention to East Timor as one of the few countries where the ICRC is prevented from

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giving relief to the victims of a military conflict. At a press conference in Geneva in January 1985, he said that many countries, including Indonesia, were making it impossible for the Committee to operate in accordance with Geneva conventions governing the conduct of war. By contrast, the ICRC had no problems in working with the Fretilin administration in the period from September to December of 1975. An ICRC report dated October 13, 1975, said simply: "ICRC has access to all prisoners."[48]

14. International organisations: The Movement of Non-Aligned Nations

East Timor has received useful diplomatic support from the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations. Indonesia was, in point of fact, one of the countries that paved the way for the organisation at the Bandung meeting in 1955 (under Sukarno) and has traditionally been highly respected in the Third World for its struggle against colonialism. It seems somewhat paradoxical, therefore, that it has since then begun a new colonialism on its own, fighting national liberation movements in East Timor as well as in West Papua.

At the fifth summit meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976, the organisation declared its support for self-determination. During the period until the next summit meeting in Havanna, Cuba, Indonesia worked hard to alter this decision and they almost succeeded, because some other members -- i.e. Vietnam and Cuba -- needed Indonesia's vote in another case. Having pledged to "support the struggle for independence and freedom carried on by the people of East Timor" in 1976, Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong stated two years later (following a talk with Suharto) that by now he "fully understood" Indonesia's position on the issue (an echo of Kissinger three years earlier). Cuba too had supported East Timor since the invasion, but in April 1979, the Cuban minister of industry travelled to Jakarta to deliver a personal invitation to Suharto from Castro to take part in the Havanna conference due in September of that year. And on that occasion the minister promised not to enter East Timor as a subject of discussion. Two months later, a preparatory meeting in

Colombo decided to delete the section on East Timor from the documents. All this appears to have been part of a political horse-trade in which Indonesia would recognize the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in return for Vietnamese and Cuban recognition of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. In the end, however, the plan broke down when Indonesia refused to recognize the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh, following which Cuba decided to raise the East Timor issue after all, and so the right to self-determination was reconfirmed by the sixth summit meeting in Havanna in September 1979.

Meanwhile, Indonesia was still working for a change and in June 1982, a preparatory meeting in Havanna decided to delete the East Timor section. In his speech, the Indonesian representative (who was criticized by Mozambique and others) emphasized the fact that the people of East Timor had demonstrated their full support for integration by taking part in the parliamentary elections one month earlier (where, we recall, the voter turnout was more than loo per cent; section 2 above). Accordingly, East Timor was an internal matter not to be discussed by other ~~national~~ nations, he said.

The seventh summit meeting was originally planned for Baghdad, Iraq, in September ~~1982~~ of that year. But at that time, the movement had been split by another conflict, namely the war between Iraq and Iran, which began in September 198o, and since it was not considered appropriate to hold a ~~meeting~~ conference on peace and international understanding while two of the members were at war with each other and one of them moreover was host of the conference, it was postponed and moved to New Delhi, India, in March 1983. And here, at long last, Indonesia finally reached its goal when all reference to the issue was removed from the Final Declaration.[49]

9/

15. The United Nations

East Timor has also received useful diplomatic support from the United Nations where the issue has been discussed in the Security Council and the General Assembly in New York as well as in the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The Security Council has adopted two resolutions condemning the invasion and calling for withdrawal of the Indonesian troops. This happened on December 22, 1975 (unanimously), and again on

April 22, 1976 (12 to none with two abstensions and one absent). Although these resolutions are binding, Indonesia has not complied.

The General Assembly has adopted similar resolutions annually from 1975 to 1982. These resolutions are not binding. Indonesia can simply ignore them and has indeed done so. The diplomatic impact of UN support, however, has been eroded by a gradual decline in the number of supporting countries and the watering-down of the language of the resolutions. In 1975, 72 countries supported the resolution condemning the Indonesian invasion (with lo against and 43 abstensions). By 1982, the number of countries supporting the by-now diluted resolution had declined to 5o (with 46 against and another 5o abstensions; a very narrow margin).

A clear voting pattern emerged from the very beginning with few exceptions and only minor variations over the years: Most western countries abstain while many Third World and socialist countries vote in favour. The U.S. is against as is Australia (since 1978). China and the USSR are in favour, but the most solid backers are the former Portuguese colonies in Africa: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome & Principe and Cape Verde. Brazil is also in favour because of the Portuguese connection. Support for Indonesia's position comes from regimes like Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Turkey (which has its own invasion going on in Cyprus). Indonesia's chief trading partner, Japan, has always supported Jakarta. Among the few western countries that have supported self-determination, one may note Sweden (until 1979), Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, and finally Portugal, the former colonial power, which is committed by its constitution, though it has never been very active on the issue.

The period from late 1975 to early 1976 was of crucial importance to what transpired later on. This was when the UN might have acted decisively but failed to do anything of substance. In his memoirs, the former U.S. ambassador to the UN, Daniel P. Moynihan, provides an explanation for this fact when he says that "..... the U.S. wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the UN prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success." Moynihan reveals that he was aware of the nature of that "success." He cites a February 1976 estimate that some 6o,ooo people had been killed, explaining that this is lo per cent of the population, "almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War." Later on, Moynihan became a U.S. Senator and in December 198o, he addressed a private conference on the UN which issued a resolution denouncing the world organisation as "no longer the guardian of social justice, human rights and equality among nations." It said the UN was "perverted by irrelevant political machinations" and was "in danger of becoming a force against peace itself." An intriguing situation, as Noam Chomsky has rightly pointed out: The world body being denounced for its inefficiency with regard to human rights and peace by a former UN ambassador who is actually boasting about his "success" in helping to cause a massacre that he compares to the consequences of Nazi aggression, not to speak of the far larger number of victims in the subsequent period.[5o]

And U.S. efforts to "pervert" the UN were not limited to "political machinations" of the Moynihan variety, it was later revealed. Immediately after the invasion the UN did, in fact, decide to send a special representative to the territory (Security Council resolution of December 22, 1975). But when U.S. intelligence agencies learned that Indonesia considered sinking the frigate with the UN representative onboard, they simply buried the information deep in their files without alerting the UN that the ship might be torpedoed. Eventually, the UN representative visited Indonesia-controlled territory in East Timor (only three towns) in January 1976, but his attempts in February to reach Fretilin-controlled areas from Darwin were sabotaged by Indonesian and Australian governments.[51]

In September 1983, discussion of East Timor by the General Assembly was deferred, and the same thing happened in September 1984, but the issue was listed for the 4oth session in the fall of 1985. The proposal to defer was initiated by Portugal and moved by Iceland. Two reasons were given: uncertainty about the actual situation in East Timor and the fact that consultations were continuing between the Secretary-General and the parties involved. As for the actual situation, it should not have been too difficult to discover that there was a war going on. As for the consultations, Fretilin had been completely excluded (as explained above: section 12), although General Assembly resolution no. 37/3o of November 23, 1982, instructs the Secretary-General to initiate consultations "with all the parties directly concerned." Indonesia, of course, hailed the deferral as a victory, saying that it might be "the last nail in the Fretilin coffin," as the Jakarta Post put it. Some observers also speculated that Portugal preferred to postpone the issue rather than risk losing the vote though there was no evidence that Portugal had engaged in any serious lobbying for the Timor cause in the run up to the General Assembly.[52]

The Human Rights Commission did not discuss the issue until February 1983, when it adopted a resolution that supports self-determination and condemn human rights abuses. The same ting happened again in February 1984 (when the former bishop, Martinhu da Costa Lopes, gave testimony), but in early 1985, during its 41st session, the Commission decided to delete East Timor from its agenda. (Even so, the issue was discussed but only under the general item of self-determination. Amnesty International and three other non-governmental organisations gave testimony.) This was a serious setback, coming as it did, on top of the consultations led by the Secretary-General which ignored the right of the people to be represented in negotiations about their own fate. Far from showing any signs of respecting East Timor's right to self-determination or acknowledging the depth of suffering being inflicted on the people, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar recently told the press in Jakarta that the atmosphere at the UN on the question of East Timor "is improving so much that I don't think it will come up any more. Or at least, that's what I hope." Commented TAPOL in London:

"This top UN official really needs to be asked whether he actually said the words attributed to him by the Indonesian press. What right has he so publicly to flout the UN Charter? His further remark that he was pleased that the Indonesian president and foreign minister welcome his personal efforts to establish contact between Indonesia and Portugal shows the extent to which the UN Secretariat is now serving the interests of a military regime that has annexed another country by force of arms."

If the UN should eventually delete the item from its agenda altogether, it will not mean the end of the struggle. But it will mean the loss of an important platform to keep the issue alive. Moreover, as one delegate said at a recent meeting of the UN Decolonization Committee in Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea), it will also mean that "the UN henceforth commits hypocrisy when interfering with any colonial problems whatsoever."[53]

3/

16. International protest and support

In spite of heavy Indonesian and U.S. lobbying in favour of Jakarta views, there has over the years been a continuous and principled support ~~for East Timor's right to self-determination and independence and against the Indonesian aggression~~ in the world community in favour of East Timor's right to self-determination and independence and against the Indonesian aggression. Let us here, by way of conclusion, single out some of the major examples that have occurred since the last UN General Assembly resolution of late 1982.

In September 1983, solidarity and human rights groups from England, Holland, Sweden, West Germany and Portugal issued a statement calling on ~~the governments~~ their governments to stop the arms export to Indonesia and to support the East Timorese people.

Two months later, the Conference of Indonesian Bishops, often considered close to the local authorities, sent a six-page letter to Timorese clergy assuring them of their support and calling for the respect of human rights in East Timor. It was the first time the [redacted] Bishops had expressed in an open letter their concern over the situation as they urged officials to work in a "spirit of honesty" to resolve the [redacted] problem, and this open letter promped Pope John Paul II to cancel

4/ Indonesia from the list of Asian countries that he visited the following year (May 1984).[54]

In December 1983, more than loo members of the U.S. Congress, led by Representative Tony P. Hall, Democrat of Ohio, signed a letter to president Reagan urging him to "add the suffering of the people of East Timor to America's foreign policy agenda." The letter asked the president to help in getting officials of the ICRC into the territory. Pointing out that Portugal and Australia had shown concern, the letter stated: "We hope you will work with Portugal and Australia to develop 5/ creative policies to address the underlying causes of the ongoing human suffering in East Timor."[55]

At the same time, 128 members of the British Parliament supported a resolution calling on the government "to halt the sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia and to take other urgent steps to press Indonesia to halt military operations."

In January 1984, a deputation of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, led by Lord Avebury, Liberal, urged the Foreign Office that the UN consultations should include Fretilin and could only do so if the Secretary-General or his envoy were physically present in East Timor. The deputation also asked the British government to persuade the Indonesian government to cease military operations, and further called upon the British government to suspend shipments of arms to Indonesia as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Indonesia in favour of a ceasefire.

Same month, the Angolan minister of information (who had attended the Conference of Information Ministers of the Non-Aligned Nations in Jakarta) held a press conference there specifically to talk about East Timor. Indonesian journalists were banned from attending, but many foreign reporters were there.

Two months later, a broad-based group of 133 Portuguese citizens criticized President Reagan for remaining silent and inactive in the face of violence and suffering in East Timor. The accusation was contained in an open letter, signed by a former prime minister, several exministers, 5o members of parliament, writers, academics and other prominent personalities of Portuguese society. The letter reminded the president that he was uniquely well placed to intervene in defence of the human rights of the East Timorese because "most of the armaments used by Indonesia are of U.S. origin."

Also in March 1984, the Portuguese bishops issued a statement expressing solidarity with the people of East Timor. The church, the bishops said, "must make its voice heard in order to stop the injustices being suffered by the Timorese people and to ensure that they can, themselves, determine their future in peace and liberty." The statement ended with a call to the Portuguese government, "historically, morally and juridically responsible," to the Indonesian government, "the occupying power," and to various international institutions to do everything in their power to bring an end to this tragic and seemingly endless situation.[56] 6/

In May 1984, the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group sent out a dossier to all members of the IGGI in advance of the upcoming annual meeting in the Hague, calling on them to cease giving economic assistance to Indonesia because of the army death squads in Indonesia itself, the genocidal conditions in East Timor and injustices in West Papua.

One month later, the Japanese Catholic Council for Justice and Peace raised the issue with the Portuguese prime minister Mario Soares on the occasion of his visit to Tokyo. In a letter, signed by the Council's president, bishop Aloisius Soma, the Council said: "We wish to plead with Your Excellency to do all in your power to carry out the mandate in your new constitution to make every effort to work for the realization of self-determination for the East Timorese who, despite annexation and invasion by Indonesia, continue to struggle for their independence and for the survival of their culture."[57] 7/

Also in June 1984, a bipartisan group of 123 Representatives and 22 Senators of the U.S. Congress appealed to Secretary of State George Shultz, urging him to raise the issue during his official visit to Jakarta, scheduled for the following month. When Shultz did so, it was an occasion for much reporting and comment in the American press. The cover-up that existed during the first four years of the conflict is long gone. Since the end of 1979, East Timor has been mentioned in the international press from time to time, and there is even much sympathy for the plight of the people there. Nonetheless, much of what is written is still dishonest in that it ignores the western arms sales to Indonesia and the consequent western responsibility for Indonesia's actions. A *New York Times* editorial (of July 11, 1984) was typical of this kind of reporting. But with a rare honesty, the Oakland *Tribune* editorialized: "For too long the United States has spoken softly and carried no stick at all in the face of a modern-day massacre of innocents..... U.S. counter-insurgency aircraft wreaked havoc on villages and crops through incendiary bombing attacks. Though such offensive use of American-supplied weapons was illegal, the U.S. continued to offer Indonesia further arms..... While the U.S. denounces the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's conquest of Cambodia, it accepts as a *fait accompli* Indonesia's yet unfinished 'pacification' of Timor..... Shultz has at least taken up the matter with Indonesia's foreign minister during his recent visit..... 58 ✓ East Timor may be small and remote, but it remains close to the hearts of Americans who deplore its tragic fate."[58]

In July 1984, Pope John Paul II used the occasion of accepting the credentials of Indonesia's new ambassador to the Holy Sea to admonish the Indonesian government. In his first public criticism of the situation in East Timor, he told the ambassador that "the Holy Sea continues to follow the situation with preoccupation..... It is the ardent wish of the Holy Sea that all the rights of individuals be respected and that every effort be made to lighten the suffering of the people by facilitating the work 59 ✓ of relief organisations and by assuring the access of humanitarian aid to those in need."[59]

In April 1985, a bipartisan group of 131 Representatives of the U.S. Congress urged president Reagan to use his visit to Portugal the following month to express American concern over the tragedy of East Timor: "We believe your visit to Portugal provides an excellent opportunity for the United States to join with Portugal in calling for access by the Red Cross to East Timor," the lawmakers told Reagan. "An indication of your interest could contribute significantly to efforts to prevent further bloodshed and misery in East Timor," they said. The letter was drafted by

Tony P. Hall, and it was one of the largest Congressional expressions of support to date regarding the Timor tragedy. In a press release, Tony Hall himself added that "the plight of the East Timorese is very much the responsibility of the United States as long as we are supplying Indonesia with the very arms which are being used to suppress their rights."[60]

Also in 1985, TAPOL in London started a drive for a world-wide campaign among parliamentarians supporting the right of East Timor's people to be represented at the talks being held between Portugal and Indonesia, and on June 3, Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, announced the result at a press conference in the House of Commons: a total of 411 national parliamentarians and members of the European Parliament had signed the appeal. The press conference, which took place on the eve of the annual IGGI meeting in Holland, even as the western governments prepared to donate huge sums in economic aid to Indonesia, was virtually ignored by the international media.

17. The future

Meanwhile, the conflict continues. In an account dated January 1, 1985, which was recently smuggled out of the country and reported in the British Observer (May 12, 1985), msgr. Carlos Belo, the bishop of Dili, says that "an upheaval of gigantic and tragic proportions" is taking place, in which the identity of the Timorese people is threatened by destruction. Young people have been press-ganged into service as auxiliary forces in military operations, he says. "Successive, systematic and regular 'cleaning-up operations' are launched by the Indonesian army against centres of resistance." Villagers, even the most simple and humble peasants, have been arrested in waves, he reports. There is a permenent threat of reprisals with summary executions, by shooting, of the men and youths of villages considered to be sympathetic to the resistance forces. The war is still growing, msgr. Belo claims:

"A war that continues for nine years cannot be imputed to the blind obstinacy of a minority," he says, adding that "the attempt to Indonesianize the Timorese people represents a slow assassination of their culture. To kill their culture is to kill the people themselves."

NOTES

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
EAST TIMOR
OMBAI STRAIT
WETAR STRAIT
Maumeta
DILI
Manatuto
Baucau
Lospalos
Liquica
Maubara
Ermera
Remexio
Aileu
Maliana
Ainaro
Same
Viqueque
Lacluta
Ossu
Baguia
Betano
Zumalai
Bobonaro
Atsabe
Suai
Lebos
Balibo
Batugade
OE-CUSSE
Pante Macassar
WEST TIMOR
TIMOR SEA
EAST TIMOR

Map of East Timor taken from Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor, Zed Books: London 1984, p. v.